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A USTIN V. LITVAK, COLORADO'S STATUTE OF REPOSE FOR
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS: AN UNEASY SLEEP
INTRODUCTION
In the mid-1970s, the "medical malpractice crisis" received extensive media coverage and commanded the attention of state legislators as
well.' Legislative response to the "crisis" resulted in substantive
changes in the common-law tort system of compensation for injured pa-

tients. 2 One of the most popular reforms adopted was the reduction of
time periods in statutes of limitation. In the years following their passage, these reforms faced constitutional challenges in the courts and dissatisfaction in the legal community engendered by their harsh effects on4
plaintiffs. 3 Consequently, many statutes were amended and refined;
legislative and judicially-created exceptions to the new laws arose.
These exceptions have subsequently been challenged on constitutional
grounds.

5

In Austin v. Litvak, 6 the Supreme Court of Colorado found the limited exceptions to the state's statute of repose to be unconstitutional as
applied to the plaintiffs. The court held that the classifications created
by the exceptions were arbitrary, and that they denied certain groups of
plaintiffs equal protection under both the Colorado and United States
Constitutions. 7 Of paramount importance is the court's remedy, which
extended the discovery rule beyond its former limitation to victims of
fraudulent concealment and foreign objects claims, 8 and granted benefits to victims of negligent misdiagnosis as well. 9
This comment will first examine the policy considerations behind
statutes of limitation and repose and the social phenomena which triggered their recent evolution in Colorado. Next, this comment will focus
on the decision in Austin v. Litvak, analyzing the court's reasoning and
discussing the case's relationship to past landmark decisions in this state
involving medical malpractice statutes of limitation. Finally, this com1. See infra text accompanying text 52-60.

2. Learner, Restrictive Medical Malpractice Compensation Schemes: A Constitutional "Quid
Pro Quo" Analysis to Safeguard Individual Liberties, 18 HAsv. J. ON LEGIS. 143, 146 (1981).
3. See, e.g., Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736
(1976); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980); Graley v. Satayatham, 74
Ohio Op. 2d 316, 343 N.E.2d 832 (1976). See generally Redish, Legislative Response to the
Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional Implications, 55 TEx. L. REv. 759 (1977)
(advocating judicial restraint in the controversial area of reform measures designed to alleviate the crisis).
4. White & McKenna, Constitutionalityof Recent Malpractice Legislation, 13 FORUM 312
(1978).
5. See id at 313-15.
6. 682 P.2d 41 (Colo. 1984).
7. Id at 52; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 25.
8. 682 P.2d at 53.
9. Id at 44.
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ment will examine the decision's impact on the medical malpractice crisis in Colorado.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

Statutes of Limitation: The Origin of the ConstitutionalChallenge

Statutes of limitation have existed in common-law jurisprudence
since the seventeenth century. 10 Rooted in public policy, they are
designed to protect potential defendants from the burden of defending
claims originating in the distant past. I This protection is accomplished
by prescribing a period within which a plaintiff "must bring his cause of
action to the courts or lose his right to assert it thereafter."' 12 Thus,
statutes of limitation relieve a defendant from having to defend a claim
which he reasonably assumed was forgotten. Additionally, they eliminate the evidentiary problems that accompany "stale claims," such as
the unavailability of evidence and witnesses, and the deterioration of
memories over time.' 3 Other recognized benefits of these statutes include the prevention of plaintiffs "sitting on their rights," and the elimination of fraudulent claims or claims brought merely to harass
defendants. 14

Statutes of limitation begin to run when a plaintiffs claim "accrues." The time of accrual varies according to statute and jurisdiction.
Courts and legislatures commonly adopt one of two methods for determining time of accrual: date of the negligent act or omission which
causes injury or time at which the plaintiff discovers or reasonably could
15
have discovered his cause of action.
B.

Absolute Statutes of Repose: A Stricter Limitation

Absolute statutes of repose differ from statutes of limitation in that
the time of the accrual of the cause of action is immaterial since "the
prescriptive period of a statute of repose begins upon the occurrence of
a specified event regardless of when the injuries result or when the cause
10. See Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HAuv. L. REV. 1177, 1177
(1950).
11. See, e.g., Kelley, The Discovery Rulefor PersonalInjury Statutes of Limitations: Reflections
on the British Experience, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1641, 1645 (1978).
12. Note, Medical Malpractice Statute of Repose: An Unconstitutional Denial of Access to the
Courts: Colton v. Dewey, 63 NEB. L. REv. 150, 153 (1983).
13. Note, Preserving Causes of Action in Latent Disease Cases: The Locke v. Johns-Manville
Corp. Date-of-the-InjuryAccrual Rule, 68 VA. L. REv. 615, 619 (1982). See Recent Cases, Medical Malpractice: Ohio's Statute of Limitations: Baird v. Loeffler, 16 AKRON L. REv. 302, 305
(1982).
14. Kelley, supra note 11, at 1645. See Schiffman v. Hospital for Joint Diseases, 36
A.D.2d 31, 35, 319 N.Y.S.2d 674, 678, appeal denied, 29 N.Y.2d 483 (1981). See generally
Kubrick v. United States, 444 U.S. 111 (1979) (unjust to compel defendant to defend
against state claims); Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944) (purpose of
statute of limitations is discouraging unnecessary delay and avoiding the prosecution of
stale claims); Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164, 371 A.2d 170 (1977) (purpose of
the statute of limitations is fairness to the defendant).
15.

1 D. LOUISELL & H. WiLmAs, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE,

13.07 (1981).

1985]

AUSTIN v. LITVAK

of action accrues." 1 6 However, both statutes of limitation and absolute
statutes of repose are designed to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time and to suppress stale or fraudulent claims.
Statutes of repose were one of the legislative responses to the perceived medical malpractice crisis. 1 7 Between 1975 and 1977, absolute
statutes of repose were instituted in twenty-five states. 18 The actual effectiveness of such statutes depends a great deal upon whether the prescriptive period may be tolled and, if so, the circumstances required for
tolling. Many legislatures have instituted exceptions to their statutes of
repose, the most prevalent of these being the "foreign object" exception.' 9 Under this exception, the discovery rule applies and the statute
20
is tolled until the plaintiff discovers his cause of action.
C.

The Discovery Rule

The primary purpose of the discovery rule is to prevent statutes of
limitation from depriving injured patients of their causes of action
before they are aware that they exist. 21 Under the rule, a plaintiff's
cause of action does not accrue until he discovers, or has a reasonable
opportunity to discover, his injury and its cause. 22 The rationale behind
the widespread acceptance of the discovery rule is the unavoidable injustice and harsh results stemming from the imposition of the traditional
theory of accrual, 23 under which the statutory period begins to run upon
the occurrence of the negligent act or omission. Both legislators and
judges have found the effects of the old theory on plaintiffs' rights to be
unfair and unconscionable. 24 The discovery rule was first advocated in
1917 in Hahn v. Claybrook,25 a medical malpractice case involving negligent treatment. It was not used again until 1936, in Huysman v. Kirsch,26
another malpractice case in which a foreign object was left in a patient's
body. Application of the rule spread with the rise in the number of latent disease actions brought to the courts. 2 7 The most well known of
16. Note, supra note 12 at 153. See McGovern, The Variety, Polity and Constitutionality of
Products Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 579, 584 (1981). See, e.g., Howell v.
Burk, 90 N.M. 688, 693, 568 P.2d 214, 225 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977) (Sutin, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 91 N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413 (N.M. 1977).
17. Note, supra note 12 at 153.
18. See id. note 54 at 162.
19. See supra note 15.
20. 682 P.2d at 46.
21. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, PUB. No. (OS) 73-88, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMM'N ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

22, 30

(1973) (hereinafter cited as HEW Report); Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses
to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1417, 1432 (1975).
22. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 31 (4th ed. 1971).

23. See Rosane v. Senger, 149 P.2d at 375-76; Comment, Medical Malpractice Statute of
Limitations as Special Legislation: Woodward v. Burnham City Hospital, 55 CH.-KENT L. REv.
519, 521 (1978).
24. See id See also supra note 15.
25. 130 Md. 179, 100 A. 83 (1917).
26. 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936).
27. See Note, Preserving Causes of Action in Latent Disease Cases: The Locke v. JohnsManville Corp. Date-of-the-Injuy Accrual Rue, 68 VA. L. REv. 615 (1982). See infra note 29.
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these cases, Urie v. Thompson, 2 8 involving recovery under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, has greatly influenced state courts in their adoption of
the discovery rule. 29 Some states have extended the discovery rule to
latent disease cases, finding it too difficult to distinguish such cases from
0
foreign object cases.3
D.

Medical Malpractice Statutes of Limitation and Repose in Colorado

From 1925 until 1971, Colorado plaintiffs had two years after their
cause of action accrued to file a complaint.3 1 Colorado courts construed
"accrue" to mean the time at which a plaintiff discovered or could have
discovered his cause of action;3 2 a 1971 amendment to the statute explicitly adopted the discovery rule. The amendment also imposed, however, a strict six-year statute of repose on all claims with the exception of
34
foreign object cases. 3 3 In 1976, that period was reduced to five years,
35
and in 1977 it was further reduced to the current three-year period.
At that time an exception for fraudulent concealment cases was added to
the foreign object exception.3 6 Currently in Colorado the statutory period begins to run on the date of the negligent act or omission giving
rise to the injury, or upon the date of discovery if the claim involves
fraudulent concealment of a foreign object.3 7 Thus, a plaintiff whose
claim does not come under either of the two exceptions must bring his
cause of action to the courts within three years of the act or omission or
38
forfeit his right to assert it.
28. 337 U.S. 163 (1949). In this case, the plaintiff had contracted silicosis as a result
of inhaling silica dust for 30 years at his job. One year after retirement, he learned of his
injury and filed a claim. Abandoning the traditional rule of accrual, the Court handed
down a landmark decision declaring that the plaintiffs "blameless ignorance" should not
bar his claim since the purpose of the statute of limitations is to require the assertion of a
claim after notice of the invasion of legal rights. Id. at 170.
29. The rationale enunciated in Urie was first applied to a medical malpractice case
under the Federal Tort Claims Act in Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d 234 (5th Cir.
1962). In that case, injuries resulting from the transfusion of the wrong blood type at a VA
Hospital did not manifest themselves until several years later. The court held that "a claim
for medical malpractice accrues . . . when the claimant discovers, or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, should have discovered the acts constituting . . . malpractice." Id
at 240. The states of Kentucky, Maryland, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania have carved
out exceptions to their statutes of limitations for latent disease plaintiffs: Louisville Trust
Co. v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 580 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Ky. 1979) (mesothelioma); Harig
v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (mesothelioma); Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164, 371 A.2d 170 (1977) (blindness caused by oral
contraceptive); Anthony v. Koppers Co., Inc., 284 Pa. Super. 81, 425 A.2d 428 (1980)
(lung cancer from coke oven emissions), rev'd, 496 Pa. 119, 436 A.2d 181 (1981) (discovery
rule does not prevent running of statute of limitations in wrongful death action and survival action brought more than two years after the death from cancer).
30. See supra note 29.
31. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 87-1-6 (1953).
32. See, e.g., Owens v. Brochner, 172 Colo. 525, 474 P.2d 603 (1970); Rosane v.
Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944).
33. 1971 CoLo. SEss. LAws 232.
34. 1976 CoLo. SEss. LAws 90.
35. COLO. Rav. STAT. § 13-80-105 (Supp. 1984).
36. lId
37. Id
38. Id

1985]
E.

AUSTIN v. LITVAK

The Medical Malpractice Crisis: Menace or Mirage?

Peaking in notoriety in the mid-1970s,3 9 the "medical malpractice
crisis" was the phrase coined to describe a situation where physicians
experienced on unprecedented, meteoric rise in their insurance premiums for medical malpractice coverage. 40 These escalating rates allegedly resulted in a movement of doctors to lower risk areas of medicine
and lower risk areas of the country, 4 1 a scarcity of insurance companies
willing to insure doctors, 42 and soaring health care costs. Reports of
these problems generated concern in the public and in the medical profession which, in turn, pressured legislators to take remedial action.
This resulted in the enactment of statutes which sacrificed the rights of
plaintiffs in the interest of alleviating the "crisis" and thereby benefiting
43
the community as a whole.
The causes of the crisis most frequently cited are an increase in the
size of awards, 4 4 the number of medical malpractice suits, 4 5 and the resulting practice of insurance companies maintaining huge reserves to
cover the payment of judgments. 4 6 Various authorities, however, have
noted the dearth of statistical data to support allegations that these are,
in fact, the causes of the crisis. 4 7 Other critics of the purported crisis,
among them members of the Colorado legislature, have laid the blame
on insurance companies themselves, claiming that they reap huge profits
from unduly high premiums. 4 8 Still others claim that insurance companies have been forced to charge high rates, not because of huge amounts
39. See HEW REPORT, supra note 21, at 73-78. See generally Note, supra note 12, at 160
n.37 (author examines the legislative reaction to the malpractice crisis and its results).
40. See HEW REPORT, supra note 21; Segar, Is Malpractice Insurable?, 51 IND. L.J. 128,
128 (1975); Redish, supra note 3, at 759-760 (between 1960 and 1970, insurance rates for
some sectors of the medical profession increased tenfold).
41. Redish, supra note 3, at 760.
42. As with other facets of the "crisis," the unavailability of insurance is disputed.
One source states that there has been a 90 per cent decrease nationally in the number of
insurance companies writing medical malpractice insurance. Oregon Medical Ass'n v.
Rawls, No. 421-496, slip. op. at 1 (Or. Cir. Ct. May 4, 1966), rev'don other grounds, 276 Or.
1101, 557 P.2d 64 (1976). The HEW REPORT, on the other hand, reported that medical
malpractice insurance was currently widely available. HEW REPORT, supra note 21, at 3839.
43. See Note, supra note 12, at 160. See generally HEW REPORT, supra note 21, at 12-13.
44.

HEW REPORT, supra note 21, at 6-12.

45. Redish, supra note 3, at 760-61.
46. Insurance companies often impose artificially high premiums to protect themselves against high damage awards in the future, a phenomenon termed by the industry as
the "long tail problem." Learner, supra note 2, at 145. For a discussion of the "long tail
problem" and the insurance scheme which makes it a problem, see Comment, The "ClaimsMade" Dilemma in ProfessionalLiability Insurance, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 925, 926 (1975); see also
Sepler, ProfessionalMalpracticeLitigation Crisis: Danger or Distortion?, 15 F. 493 (1980) (an indepth statistical analysis of the data relied upon by lobbyists and legislators when claiming
the existence of the malpractice crisis reveals serious discrepancies between data and
conclusions).
47. See, e.g., Note, The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act. Legislative Surgey on Patient's
Rights, V~A.. U.L. REV. 303, 344 (1976) (authorities cited therein).
48. HEW REPORT, supra note 21, at 6-12; S. Res. 150, 51st G.A., 1st Reg. Sess., H.R.
Floor Debate, May 4, 1977, Colo., Tape No. 46A-M2T. The Colorado Senate Judiciary
Committee Proceedings produced data indicating that 15.4 million dollars in premiums
were paid annually by the states' physicians while only 200,000 dollars were paid out by
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paid out in damages, but rather to cover poor investment practices. 49
Finally, the relationship between high premiums and rising health care
50
costs has been questioned.
Thus, the malpractice crisis may be in part a creation of the media,5 1 and therefore grossly exaggerated. 52 The Supreme Court of
Idaho has indeed questioned whether a medical malpractice crisis ever
truly existed. 53 Many more critics have stated that the crisis, if it did
exist, was not of national proportions and that the majority of states
were not experiencing a malpractice crisis. 54 Colorado legislators opposing the most recent amendment to the statute of repose expressed
55
the opinion that there was no medical malpractice crisis in Colorado.
Although many factual issues have been raised regarding the "crisis," one thing is certain: it has generated on enormous amount of legislative activity. Almost every state responded with some sort of
legislation aimed at eliminating the problem,5 6 and numerous jurisdic57
tions have enacted strict statutes of repose similar to Colorado's.
Again, the need for this flurry of activity has been questioned since sensational media coverage and extensive lobbying by medical associations
and physicians' groups imposed intense pressure on state legislatures to
enact remedial legislation. 58 Unfortunately, such legislation has failed
to impede the escalation of insurance rates in states where it has been
passed, and there are no guarantees that efforts on the part of Colorado
59
lawmakers will fare any better.
insurance companies to cover medical malpractice liability. S. Judiciary Comm. Proceedings, March 9, 1977, Colo., Tape No. 20A-MIT.
49. See Aitken, Medical Malpractice: The Alleged "Crisis" in Perspective, 637 INs. L.J. 90, 96
(1976); Oster, Medical Malpractice Insurance, 45 INS. COUNS. J. 228, 231 (1978).
50. Kelaher, The Legislative Immunization of the Florida Medical Community, 56 FLA. BJ.
616, 616 (1982) (author suspects that rising costs of medical supplies and equipment is
more to blame for increasing costs of medical care than escalating premiums to doctors).
51. See Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976);
Learner, supra note 2, at 143 (note cites "unprecedented news media coverage").
52. 2 D. LoUISELL & H. WILLAMs, supra note 15, at 20.07 n.55 (Supp. 1979).
53. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399, 414 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
54. The trial court in Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 136 (N.D. 1978) concluded
that there was no crisis in the state of North Dakota vis-a-vis the cost or availability of
medical malpractice insurance. The North Dakota court's findings were echoed by the
Supreme Court of Idaho in Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399,
414 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977). See HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Health of the
Senate Comm of Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (statement of Dr. Roger
Egeberg, Special Ass't to the Sec'y for Health Policy) (approximately 35 states are not
experiencing a malpractice crisis).
55. S. Res. 150, 52nd G.A., 1st Reg. Sess., S. Floor Debate, March 18, 1977, Colo.,
Tape No. 27A-M2T.
56. Note, supra note 12, at 150 n.51 (between 1975 and 1977, 52 states and territories
enacted remedial legislation).
57. Twenty-four states, including Colorado, Kansas, Utah, California, and Illinois,
currently have an absolute period of repose in their malpractice statutes of limitation. See
generally id at 150 n.54.
58. Learner, supra note 2, at 143.
59. See 2 D. LOuISEuL. & H. Wi.,IAmsS, supra note 15, at 20.07 n.55 (Supp. 1981); T.
LOMBARDI, JR., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE, FOREWORD at xi, 92-93 (1978); Note, The

Indiana Medical MalpracticeAct: Legislative Surgery on Patient's Rights, VAL. U.L. Rav. 303, 350
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A.

AUSTIN v. LITVAK

Factual Setting

In September, 1963, Richard L. Austin checked into St. Anthony's
Hospital in Denver for the treatment of kidney stones. 60 While at St.
Anthony's, he underwent various tests and examinations. At that time,
John Litvak, M.D., informed the plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Austin, that the
test results showed that Mr. Austin had a type of brain tumor known as a
parasagital meningioma. Richard Austin retained Dr. Litvak to take
charge of his care. In pursuit of his duties, Dr. Litvak performed additional tests including exploratory surgery which involved placing a metal
screen in the plaintiff's skull. Following the results of these procedures,
Dr. Litvak confirmed his earlier diagnosis and advised the Austins that
the tumor was not operable without a severe risk, and that Mr. Austin
should not undergo surgery. During Richard Austin's hospitalization at
St. Anthony's, he was taken to Colorado General Hospital where additional tests were performed at Dr. Litvak's direction. It is alleged that
unbeknownst to the plaintiffs, these tests conclusively established that
Richard Austin did not have a brain tumor. It is further alleged that Dr.
Litvak knew of these test results but did not inform the plaintiffs. Sixteen years later, in May of 1979, Mr. Austin underwent another series of
medical tests and examinations necessitated by injuries received in an
automobile accident. Tests indicated that Richard Austin did not have,
and never could have had a brain tumor, since they do not disappear by
remission. Eleven months after this discovery, Mr. and Mrs. Austin filed
a lawsuit alleging medical malpractice and naming Dr. Litvak and St.
Anthony's Hospital as co-defendants.
B.

Holding and Rationale

Reversing the trial court's Order of Summary Judgment in favor of
the defendants, the Supreme Court of Colorado determined in Austin
that the state's statute of repose for medical malpractice claims was unconstitutional. 6 1 Justice Neighbors, joined by Justices Quinn and
(1976). "[Elven though a large number of states have already adopted one or more of the
[various] malpractice proposals, insurance premiums continue to increase. . . "
Whether legislative reforms can reduce the number of malpractice actions is questionable.
Redish, supra note 3, at 761-62. This scenario may be repeated in Colorado. During the
House floor debates leading to the most recent amendment to Colorado's statute of repose, 1977 Colo. Sess. Laws 198, evidence was presented that 97 per cent of all medical
malpractice claims are brought within the first two years. S. Res. 150, 51st G.A., 1st Reg.
Sess., H.R. Floor Debate, May 4, 1977, Colo., Tape No. 46A-M2T. Thus, lowering the
period of the statute of repose to three years would have little impact on reducing the
number of medical malpractice suits and, in turn, alleviating the "crisis." In addition,
legislators' conferences with the Insurance Commissioner for the state of Colorado
yielded no assurances that the proposed legislation would lower or even stabilize insurance rates. S. Judiciary Comm. Proceedings, March 9, 1977, Colo., Tape No. 20A-M1T.
Finally, even the representative of the Colorado Medical Association conceded that of the
12 states which he had surveyed that had shortened their statutes of limitations, none had
experienced decreases in insurance premium rates. Iot
60. 682 P.2d at 44.
61. Supra note 35.
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Kirshbaum, concluded that the Colorado statute violated the equal protection provisions of both the United States and Colorado Constitutions
because it impermissibly distinguished between different classes of
plaintiffs. So finding, the court extended the benefits granted by the
62
exceptions to include the plaintiff's negligent misdiagnosis claim.
The major issue addressed by the court was whether a statute of
repose governing medical malpractice claims which excepted foreign
object and knowing concealment claimants, but did not except negligent
misdiagnosis claimants, 63 denied plaintiffs of the latter class equal protection guarantees. Applying the rational basis standard, the court concluded that it was a denial. 64
The defendants contended that the court had decided the principal
issue in Mishek v. Stanton6 5 three years earlier. 66 The court disagreed,
and distinguished the plaintiff's equal protection challenge in Mishek
from the one at bar.6 7 In Mishek, the plaintiffs attacked the statute of
limitations as a whole, claiming that by distinguishing members of the
medical profession from the rest of society, the statute violated equal
protection principles. 6 8 In the instant case, the court stated that this was
not the issue in question. 69 In determining the appropriate standard to
apply, the court rejected both the strict and intermediate scrutiny tests.
It rejected the former by relying on United States Supreme Court and
state appellate court cases holding that the recovery of damages in tort
does not constitute a fundamental right and that, therefore, the strict
scrutiny standard may not be applied. 70 The court decided against the
latter test as well, declining to address its application to the instant case
62. 682 P.2d at 53.
63. 682 P.2d 41, 52 (Colo. 1984); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; CoLo. CONST. art. II,
§ 25. "Foreign object" plaintiffs are those whose cause of action centers around a physician's negligent act of leaving a foreign object in the plaintiffs body, usually subsequent to
surgery. See Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944). This exception is
probably the most widely accepted basis for application of the discovery rule and exception to state medical malpractice statutes of repose and statutes of limitations. Supra note
5. Its widespread adoption stems from the belief that foreign object cases do not pose the
evidentiary disadvantages to the defendant posed by other "stale claims" and, that in many
cases, the plaintiff is truly unaware of his or her injury until several years after the negligent act of the doctor. See Allrid v. Emory University, 249 Ga. 35, 285 S.E.2d 521 (1982).
Cases of knowing concealment, also called fraudulent concealment cases, arise when
health care professionals are aware of their negligent infliction of injury on the plaintiff but
intentionally conceal that fact from the victim. Such claimants are often favored by state
legislatures with exceptions to the statute of repose on the ground that "one should not
profit from his wrongful acts." See Davis v. Bonebrake, 135 Colo. 506, 313 P.2d 982
(1957).
64. 682 P.2d at 53.
65. 200 Colo. 514, 616 P.2d 135 (1981).
66. 682 P.2d at 48.
67. Id
68. Id. See also Mishek v. Stanton, 616 P.2d at 139.
69. 682 P.2d at 53.
70. 682 P.2d at 49-50 (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438
U.S. 59 (1978)); e.g., American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 33 Cal. 3d 674, 660
P.2d 829, 190 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1983); Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555
P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273
Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980); State treL
Strykowsky v. Wilkie, 261 N.W.2d 434 (Wis. 1978).
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on the basis that the legislative classification failed under the rational
7
basis test. '
In Austin, the Colorado Supreme Court identified two distinct
prongs in the rational basis test. 7 2 The first requires that the statutory
classification be reasonable and not arbitrary, and that it possess some
rational basis in fact. 73 To pass the second prong of the test, the classification must either "bear a rational relationship to legitimate state objectives," or be "reasonably related to a legitimate governmental
interest."' 74 The majority's in-depth examination of the correlation between legislative goals and classifications resulted in the conclusion that
75
the statute failed to meet either prong.
Following its decision in Owens v. Brockner,76 the court found the
distinctions made between knowing concealment and foreign object
claimants and the claimants of misdiagnosis to be arbitrary for lack of a
reasonable basis in fact. 7 7 To support its conclusion, the court observed
that knowing concealment claims are much more likely to pose the evidentiary problems of stale evidence and frivolous claims than are misdiagnosis cases. 78 The court also identified a governmental interest in
preserving the causes of action of claimants who have had no reasonable
opportunity to discover the negligence which caused their injury. 79
Thus, the court concluded that since the statute failed to further a legitimate governmental interest, no rational relationship existed. 80
The court supported its equal protection analysis with the New
Hampshire case of Carson v. Maurer.8 1 In Carson, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court held that restricting application of the discovery rule to
foreign object claimants violated the equal protection provision of that
state's constitution, and was not in keeping with the equitable considerations underlying the discovery rule. 82 The Supreme Court of Oregon
similarly recognized the inherent unfairness of refusing to extend the
71. 682 P.2d at 50.
72. Id. (citing Hurricane v. Kanover, Ltd., 651 P.2d 1218, 1222 (Colo. 1982) and
Smith v. Charnes, 649 P.2d 1089, 1091 (Colo. 1982)).
73. 682 P.2d at 49.
74. Id
75. Id. at 50.
76. In Owens, 172 Colo. 525, 474 P.2d 603 (1970), a case decided before the institution of a statute of repose in Colorado, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant doctors
had misdiagnosed a brain tumor as malignant when it was, in fact, benign. The plaintiffs'
claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The court held that the discovery rule,
already allowed in cases of concealment and foreign objects, should be extended to cases
of misdiagnosis and all other cases regardless of the type of negligence involved.
77. 682 P.2d at 50.
78. Id The court cites Owens, 474 P.2d at 607, and notes that a course of treatment
prescribed by the physician usually follows a diagnosis. Treatment, therefore, is an objective fact, the veracity of which can be proved or disproved by persons other than the
plaintiff.
79. 682 P.2d at 50.
80. Id

81. 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980) (plaintiffs challenged several portions of New
Hampshire's statute governing actions for medical injury including provisions regarding
the statute of limitations).
82. Id at 833.
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benefits of the discovery rule to misdiagnosis cases in Frohs v. Greene.8"
While the Austin court also noted contrary decisions 8 4 from the Supreme
86
it chose to follow its own precedent
Courts of Georgia8 5 and Missouri,
87
Brochner.
v.
Owens
established in
The Austin court chose to remedy the statute's constitutional defects
by extending the discovery rule to the plaintiffs negligent misdiagnosis
claim rather than striking the two exceptions already provided by the
statute of repose. 8 8 Again, in view of earlier decisions, the court determined the former remedy to be the more appropriate choice. 89
In addition to the equal protection question addressed by the court,
four issues of lesser importance were addressed in a more summary
fashion. The plaintiffs and amicus curiae proposed that the Austins'
claim came under both the knowing concealment and the foreign object
exceptions to the statute of repose. The court declined to entertain
either of these theories, 90 stating that negligent misdiagnosis was the
gravamen of the plaintiffs' case. 9 1 The contention that Mr. Austin had a
foreign object in his skull was rejected on the basis that the object was
placed there for therapeutic purposes with the patient's knowledge and
consent. 9 2 The second contention, based on the defendant's knowledge
of tests which indicated that there was no tumor, was based on the knowing concealment exception to the statute. The court disposed of this
issue on procedural grounds. 93 The court also refused to address the
83. 253 Or. 1, 452 P.2d 564, 564-65 (1969) (court held that a cause of action based on
misdiagnosis or negligent treatment accrues when discovered or reasonably discoverable).
84. 682 P.2d at 51-52.
85. Allrid v. Emory University, 249 Ga. 35, 285 S.E.2d 521 (1982) (medical malpractice action involving negligent treatment with substance poisonous to the deceased patient. Plaintiff sued after statutory period had elapsed and suit was barred since it did not
come under an exception. Constitutionality of exclusive foreign object exception upheld).
86. Ross v. Kansas City General Hospital and Medical Center, 608 S.W.2d 397 (Mo.
1980) (surgeon negligently performed sterilization and plaintiffs discovery of the malpractice (subsequent pregnancy) occurred after the termination of the statutory period. Constitutionality of exclusive foreign object exception upheld.).
87. 474 P.2d 603. Owens is particularly authoritative in Colorado, as it followed
Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1949) and Davis v. Bonebrake, 135 Colo.
506, 313 P.2d 982 (1954), both landmark cases in extending the bounds of the discovery
rule. With the Rosane decision, Colorado became one of the first states in the nation to
apply the discovery rule to medical malpractice cases. The foreign object claim, which
would have been barred under the case and statute law of the day, yielded a judicial rationale which has been quoted in a plethora of subsequent cases and law review articles:
"What a mockery to say to one, grievously wronged, 'certainly you had a remedy but while
your debtor concealed from you the fact that you had a right the law stripped you of your
remedy.'" Rosane, 149 P.2d at 376. In Bonebrake, a foreign object case coupled with a
claim of negligent concealment, the court followed Rosane and permitted application of the
discovery rule.
88. 682 P.2d at 53.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 46-47.
91. Id. at 47.
92. Id. The court supported its decision with Shannon v. Thornton, 155 Ga. App. 670,
272 S.E.2d 535 (1980) and Cooper v. Edinbergh, 75 A.D.2d 757, 427 N.Y.S.2d 810 (Ct.
App. 1980).
93. 682 P.2d at 47. The knowing concealment argument was not supported in either
the plaintiffs' trial court brief or in their opening brief to the Colorado Supreme Court.
Plaintiffs failed to come forward with facts supporting their theory in response to defend-
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plaintiffs' due process arguments, choosing to save that issue for another day. 94 In so doing, the majority followed the Mishek opinion in
which the court expressly reserved the question of whether Colorado's
statute of repose was in violation of the due process guarantees of both
the Colorado and United States Constitutions. 95
A final issue in the case was whether the trial court's Summary Judgment Order dismissing St. Anthony's Hospital from the case was
proper. 9 6 The court affirmed the lower court on this question, stating
that since the hospital was not itself licensed to practice medicine and no
allegations were made that it was negligent in granting the defendant
staff privileges, there existed no cause of action against St. Anthony's
97
Hospital.
Justice Dubofsky, writing a special concurrence, disagreed with the
majority that the statute of repose violated the equal protection guarantees of the Colorado Constitution, 98 but did not reveal the reasons for
her difference of opinion. Justice Dubofsky did, however, express her
opinion on whether the statute's strict three-year statute of repose violated constitutional due process guarantees, an issue reserved by the
majority. 9 9 Examination of the court's earlier decision in Rosane v.
Senger,10 0 as well as cases from other jurisdictions, 10 1 led her to conclude that a vested cause of action could not be barred by the legislature
absent some compelling justification.1 02 In her view, there existed no
03
such justification.'
Justice Rovira concurred with the majority opinion, but he disagreed with the conclusion that the exceptions to the statute of repose
were a violation of the equal protection guarantees of the Colorado
Constitution. 1 0 4 His opinion was joined by Chief Justice Erickson and
Justice Lohr. The thrust of his dissent was that the majority wrongly
identified the constitutional issue in the case. After refraining the issue,
Justice Rovira cited prior decisions of the court which upheld the legislative classification in question. He further stated that the determination
of the classes of plaintiffs for whom the statute of repose should be
tolled is within the purview of the legislature and that their decision
10 5
should not be disturbed.
ants' affirmative defense of the statute of limitations. Thus, in compliance with Colorado
law governing summary judgments, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the trial court.
94. 682 P.2d at 48.
95. Id (citing Mishek v. Stanton, 200 Colo. 514, 616 P.2d 135 (1981)).
96. 682 P.2d at 53-54.
97. Id at 54.
98. d; CoLo. CONST. art. II, § 25.
99. 682 P.2d at 55.
100. 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 572 (1940).
101. 682 P.2d at 55.
102. Id
103. Id
104. Id
105. Id
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ANALYSIS

In choosing the rational basis test as its standard of review, the Austin court applied the correct level of scrutiny for two reasons. From a
purely legal standpoint, it was the appropriate test given the fact that
neither a fundamental right 10 6 nor a suspect class 10 7 was involved; thus,
strict scrutiny was not applicable. From a tactical standpoint, because
rational basis was the most deferential test the court could apply while
still reviewing the legislation, it is impervious to criticism for being too
stringent. The decision to use the rational basis test, therefore,
strengthened the opinion against later attack against the appropriateness of the level of scrutiny chosen.
Additionally, the court's analysis under the rational basis test was,
on the whole, sound. The majority validly concluded that the distinction
made between knowing concealment and foreign object cases and misdiagnosis cases, allegedly on the grounds that the former two classes
pose fewer evidentiary problems than the latter class, had no reasonable
10 8
basis in fact.
The court's reasoning on the second prong was somewhat flawed,
106. The recovery of damages in tort is not a fundamental right. 682 P.2d at 49-50
(citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978)). The Duke
court held that limitations imposed by the Price-Anderson Act on the amount of damages
recoverable in tort by nuclear power plant accident victims was not a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Courts in California, Idaho, Indiana
and New Hampshire have determined that the right to recover for injuries is not a fundamental right when considering equal protection challenges to their states' medical malpractice statutes. See e.g., American Bank & Trust v. Community Hosp., 33 Cal. 3d 674,
660 P.2d 829, 190 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1983), afd 36 Cal. 3d 359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr.
671 (1984);Jones v. State Bd. of Med., 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied 431
U.S. 914 (1977);Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980);
Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
107. In determining that the exceptions to Colorado's statute of repose did not create a
suspect classification of misdiagnosed plaintiffs, the Austin court followed its holdings in
Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Ed., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982) and Pollack v. City and
County of Denver, 194 Colo. 380, 572 P.2d 828 (1977). In both cases, the court held that
"a classification is considered 'suspect' if it singles out religious, racial, or other discrete
and insular minorities such as those based on lineage or alienage." Lujan at 1015 n.8; see
also Pollack at 829. Misdiagnosed claimants, as a group, are not distinguishable from other
medical malpractice claimants on the basis of race, religion, lineage or alienage, and thus
the Austins would not be members of a suspect class.
108. This observation has been noted by courts of several jurisdictions, including Colorado, and by legal scholars as well. In Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hospital, 50 Hawaii 150, 433 P.2d
220 (1967), the Supreme Court of Hawaii rejected the distinction purported to exist between foreign object cases and misdiagnosis cases. The majority determined that misdiagnosis claims are neither more difficult to defend nor more prone to be fraudulent since,
as in the instant case, treatment generally follows diagnosis. The treatment is an
objective fact which may be proved or disproved by people other than the plaintiff. The fact that the treatment is the kind normally administered for the ailment
the doctor allegedly improperly diagnosed is strong evidence of the diagnosis.
Id. at 223-24.
This portion of the Yoshizaki opinion was quoted by the Supreme Court of Colorado in
Owens v. Brochner, 172 Colo. 525, 474 P.2d 603 (1970), a case remarkably similar to
Austin. In Owens, the court held that the discovery rule should be extended to all medical
malpractice claims, rather than to foreign object cases exclusively. 474 P.2d at 607.
Other courts have found no valid reason for distinguishing fraudulent concealment
and foreign object claimants from misdiagnosis claimants, stating that it is both unrealistic
and unfair to do so when applying the discovery rule. Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hosp., 46
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however. Although it is true that the exceptions reveal a governmental
interest in preserving claims where the claimant had no opportunity to
discover his cause of action, the exceptions also manifest the legitimate
governmental interest which is the basis of the statute itself: alleviation,
at least in part, of the "medical malpractice crisis."' 109 Limiting the exceptions to the statute of repose ensured that that statute will achieve its
remedial purpose. Thus, it can be argued that the limitation of the
number of exceptions furthers the legitimate governmental objective of
maintaining the availability of health care for all of society. 110 The majority's opinion failed to address this argument in its analysis of the correlation between the classifications created by the exceptions and the
legitimate governmental objectives.
Even so, the course chosen by the court to remedy the equal protection dilemma posed by the exception was appropriate and in keeping
with its past decisions."'1 And, although it may seem sweeping in some
respects, the decision is actually an example of judicial restraint. For
example, the majority chose to adhere to the conservative stance it took
in Mishek ' 12 rather than decide whether Colorado's unusually strict stat13
ute of repose violated the due process provisions of the constitution.'
The court did not throw open the floodgates and decide that any distinction between classes of medical malpractice plaintiffs violated equal protection guarantees, thus making the discovery rule available to all
4
medical malpractice plaintiffs, as has been done in other jurisdictions. 1
Ill.2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450 (1970); Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164, 371 A.2d 170
(1977); Frohs v. Greene, 253 Or. 1, 452 P.2d 564 (1969).
In addition, "most of the evidence necessary to prove or defend against liability is
likely to be documentary in nature. It is not the kind of evidence that is lost or becomes
unreliable as time passes. . . . Certainly, doctors and hospitals meticulously maintain and
store records of patient treatments." Raymond, 371 A.2d 170 at 176 relying on, Note,
Recent Developments in Wisconsin Medical MalpracticeLaw, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 893, 897 (1974).
See Comment, Medical MalpracticeStatutes of Limitation: Uniform Extension of the Discovery Rule,
55 IowA L. REV. 486 at 492 (1969); see also Note, Discovery Rule, Hays v. Hall, Gaddis v.
Smith, 25 BAYLOR L. REV. 536 at 541 (1973). See generally D. LOuISE.LL & H. WILLIAMs,
supra note 15, at 7.10 n.48.
Finally, it has been noted that passage of time creates just as many evidentiary difficulties for plaintiffs who have the burden of presenting a prima facie case as for defendants.
Yoshizaki, 433 P.2d at 223; Drill & Hambleton, Applying Statutes of Limitations and Statutes of
Repose, 19 TRIAL 106 (1983).
109. Supra note 55.
110. S. Res. Bill 150, 51st G.A., 1st Reg. Sess., H.R. Floor Debate, May 4, 1977, Colo.,
Tape No. 20A-MIT.
111. In both People v. Bramlett, 194 Colo. 205, 573 P.2d 94 (1977) and R. McG. v.
j.W., 200 Colo. 345, 615 P.2d 666 (1980), the Colorado Supreme Court chose to remedy
statutory provisions which violated equal protection guarantees by affording the petitioners the benefits conferred upon the group favored by the classification, rather than correct
the violation by abrogating the benefits of the statute for all classes.
112. 200 Colo. 514, 616 P.2d 135 (Colo. 1981).
113. 682 P.2d at 53. See 1 D. LouISELL & H. WILAMts, supra note 15, at 13.14 (survey
of the statutes of limitation and repose of all the states in the country reveals that the three
year Colorado statute is one of the shortest); legislators speaking at the floor debates in
the Colorado Senate also noticed that the proposed amendment would take Colorado out
of the mainstream, making its statute of limitations one of the shortest in the country. S.
Res. 150, 52nd G.A. 1st Reg. Sess., S. Floor Debate, March 18, 1977, Colo., Tape No.
27A-M2T.
114. E.g., Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
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Furthermore, the majority stressed throughout its opinion that it was
making a narrow ruling on a narrow issue and that its inquiry was limited to the statute as applied to the facts of the case at bar. 155 The remedy is in keeping with this approach and is thereby deferential to the
legislature. Rather than tolling the statute for all medical malpractice
claimants, it only does so for those claiming misdiagnosis.
The court's decision in Austin reflects a trend toward plaintiffs'
rights, not only in Colorado but in the nation as a whole."l 6 Other Colorado decisions, such as Bonfls v. Public Utilities Commission 1 1 7 and Lamb
v. Powder River Livestock Company, s" 8 illustrate the state's longstanding
commitment to plaintiffs' rights and its view that claimants should not
be denied access to the court.1 19 Additionally, another statute of limitation favoring some groups at the expense of others has been challenged
and found unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.' 20 Thus, the
court's decision in Austin v. Litvak is consistent with the jurisprudential
direction of this state.
Several states have promulgated remedial legislation in response to
the perceived malpractice crisis; most of the legislation has not withstood constitutional challenges. 12 ' Thirty-six states have declared,
either by legislation or in the courts, that the statute of limitations does
not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers or has an opportunity to
discover his cause of action. 122 Furthermore, courts in California, Illi115. 682 P.2d at 53.
116. See supra note 108.
117. 67 Colo. 563, 189 P.2d 775 (1920).
118. 132 F. 434 (8th Cir. 1904).
119. In Bonfils v. Public Util. Comm'n, 67 Colo. 563, 189 P.2d 775 (1920), the court
held that a statute of limitations providing no time whatsoever in which to bring an action
is not a "reasonable time" as recognized by the Colorado Constitution. The court in
Lamb v. Powder River Livestock Company, 132 F. 434 (8th Cir. 1904) held that statutes of
limitation are subject to the fundamental principle that a reasonable time must be given
for the plaintiff to exercise his right of action.
120. The court in McClanahan v. American Gilsonite Co., 494 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Colo.
1980) ruled that COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-127 (1973), a statute of limitation applying only
to contractors, violated the equal protection provisions of both the federal and state constitutions because it created classifications with no reasonable relation to the government
objectives of the statute.
121. Redish, supra note 3, at 762 (several state courts have already invalidated legislative malpractice proposals on the basis of federal and state constitutional objections); see
Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Haggerty, 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982); see also Diamond v.
E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 397 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1981). See generally McGovern, The Variety,
Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 579 (1981);
Taylor & Shields, Limitation on Recovery in Medical Negligence Cases in Virginia, 16 U. RicH. L.
REV. 799, 836 (1982); Note, Ohio's Attempts to Halt the Medical Malpractice Crisis: Effective or
Meaningless?, 9 U. DAYrON L. REV. 361, 374 (1984).
122. Note, Denial ofa Remedy, 8 COLUM.J. OF ENvrL. L. 161, 170 n.55 (1982). In Oliver
v. Kaiser Community Health Found., 449 N.E.2d 438 (Ohio 1983), the court held that the
discovery rule applied to all medical malpractice claims, overruling cases to the contrary.
Courts in the following states have handed down similar decisions: California, Hawaii,
Illinois, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia. See
Note, Ohios Attempts to Halt the Medical MalpracticeCrisis: Effective or Meaningless ?, 9 U. DAYTON L. REv. 361, 367 (1984). See generally S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE & A. GANs, THE AMERICAN
LAW OF TORTS 102247 (1983).

1985]

AUSTIN v. LITVAK

839

nois, New York, Washington, and Idaho have specifically found that legislative classifications which disfavor misdiagnosis claimants while
benefiting others are in violation of equal protection guarantees. 12 3 Indeed, the outcome of Austin v. Litvak was foreshadowed not only by
events in other states, but also by the legislative debates preceding the
passage of Colorado's statute of repose. Tapes of the floor debate indicate that certain senators warned that the statute would never withstand
the scrutiny of the supreme court due to its equal protection violations. 12 4 It must be noted, however, that at least one observer has noted
a recent trend in the opposite direction, away from the discovery
25
rule. 1
The Austin decision is likely to affect the relatively small segment of
society made up of negligent misdiagnosis claimants much more heavily
than society as a whole. Despite forecasts of the unavailability of health
care which resulted in the enactment of Colorado's strict three-year statute of repose and the truncation of the discovery rule, extending the
benefits of the statute's exceptions to one additional class of plaintiffs
should not have a significant effect on either the availability or the cost
of health care in this state for several reasons. First, as discussed earlier
in this comment, the very existence of a malpractice crisis in the nation
in general, and in Colorado in particular, has been questioned by courts,
legal scholars, and legislators. 1 26 Second, even assuming such a crisis
exists in the state of Colorado, the ability of this statute to have any
1 27
positive remedial effect is questionable both in theory and in fact.
Third, because of the narrowness of the court's holding and its remedy,
the Austin decision's greatest significance is its precedent. Austin could
conceivably foreshadow a holding that the discovery rule must apply
across the board as was the case in New Hampshire.12 8 This would, in
effect, abrogate the entire statute of repose in this area. The fact that
the court has thus far refused to address the due process issue1 2 9 indicates its current uneasiness with extending the holding of Austin.
CONCLUSION

In future years, historians may characterize the flurry of legislative
123. Valdez v. Percy, 35 Cal. 2d 338, 217 P.2d 422 (1950) (brain tumor erroneously
diagnosed as malignant and breast removed unnecessarily as result); Lipsey v. Michael
Reese Hosp., 46 Ill. 2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450 (1970) (malignant tumor wrongly diagnosed as
benign-discovery rule extended); Oliver v. Kaiser Community Health Found., 5 Ohio St.
3d 111, 449 N.E.2d 438 (1983) (cancer misdiagnosis case, discovery rule extended);
Janisch v. Mullins, 1 Wash. App. 393, 461 P.2d 895 (1969), review dismissed by stipulation, 78
Wash. 2d 997 (1970) (negligent diagnosis, negligent reading of X-ray caused blindness,
discovery rule extended); see Renner v. Edwards, 93 Idaho 836, 475 P.2d 530 (1970); see
also Camire v. United States, 535 F.2d 749 (2nd Cir. 1976).
124. See supra note 55.
125. Note, The Fairness and Constitutionalityof Statutes of Limitationsfor Toxic Tort Suits, 96
HARv. L. REV. 1683, 1683 (1983).
126. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 59.
128. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
129. Austin, 682 P.2d at 48.
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activity surrounding medical malpractice statutes of limitation and repose across the country and in Colorado as a well-intentioned but misguided overreaction to a phantom crisis.
In Austin v. Litvak, the Supreme Court of Colorado functions in its
most important and traditional capacity as the mediator between the
current demands of society and the time-honored principles of the constitution. The court held that the narrow exceptions to the state statute
of repose created constitutionally invalid classifications and were violative of the plaintiff's equal protection rights as guaranteed by the Colorado and United States Constitutions. The law in question tolled the
statutory period for foreign object and concealment cases but granted
no such exception for misdiagnosis claimants. The court wisely chose
the most deferential standard of review for its examination of this statute, although it inaccurately identified the legitimate governmental purpose. Even so, the legislative classification at issue bears no rational
correlation to the true legislative objective of the statute.
Before enacting further legislation in this area, Colorado lawmakers
must strive to obtain verifiable and unbiased data regarding the extent
of the medical malpractice crisis in this state and the effectiveness of
different legislative schemes purporting to solve the problem. Only
then will legislators be in a position to truly benefit the community with
laws that both serve society and respect the rights of its individual
members.
Elizabeth Anne Ward

